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is, or at least has heretofore been, an universally recognized exception as
to the obligation of women.
But the court seems to insist that the main ground of its opinion is
not the personal unwillingness of the applicant to fight, but rather her
profession of a creed which is opposed to fighting. The second argument
it gives for denying the applicant citizenship runs something like this:
The good order and happiness of the United States require that one should
not counsel citizens not to defend their country by arms, in contravention
of one of the principles of the Constitution. Applicant would use her
"influence" to prevent citizens from defending their country by arms.
Therefore applicant is neither well disposed to the good order and happi-
ness of the United States nor attached to this principle of the Constitu-
tion, as required by the Act of Congress. The heart of this argument
seems to be that applicant is undesirable because opposed to the constitu-
tional principles of defense of country. To this Justice Holmes replies:
"Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles of the Con-
stitution that she thinks it can be improved." It would seem that the
majoriy considered defense of country necessarily synonymous with defense
by arms, and that Holmes conceives that she believes in defense of country,
but in a mode different from the usual one. She conceives the duty as
one requiring her to work constantly for the abolition of the danger
against which the Constitution calls us to defend. Most of us think she
is stubborn not to fight when necessity calls for such: yet to her point of
view it is our own stubbornness which prevents the success of her plan
which would render fighting impossible, and defense complete. She will
not defend in our way; neither will we defend in hers. Such is the situa-
tion, as it seems to her.
As to the argument of the court that applicant would use her "influence"
to keep other citizens from fighting, it may be noted that those conscien-
tious objectors who are already citizens do this very thing (at least by
example). Hence the inquiry must be whether we are to show the same
tolerance for free thought with regard to admission into, as well as life
within this country. Holmes first says: "Some of her remarks might
excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of the Constitution
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the
principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us,
but freedom for the thought that we hate." He then makes it clear that
to draw any such distinction in treatment is by implication to question
the constitutional devotion of a respected class of citizens. He says:
"Recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant's way, I would suggest
that the Quakers have done their share to make this country what it is,
that many citizens agree with the applicant's belief, and that I had not
supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because
they believed more than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on
the Mount." J. V. H.
BnLLs AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS IN ANswER
TO FRAUD AND FAILURE or CoNsIDERATIoN-Action on a promissory note.
The defendant's answer admitted execution of the note and that the payee
endorsed and delivered it to the plaintiff before maturity and for value.
RECENT CASE NOTES
The note contained the following statement: "This note covers deferred
installments of a conditional sale contract made this day between the
payee and the maker thereof." The answer alleged facts showing failure
of consideration and fraud in the inducement. A demurrer to the answer
was sustained and the defendant, refusing to plead over, judgment was
rendered on the pleadings for the plaintiff. The defendant prosecuted this
appeal contending the above statement rendered the note non-negotiable
and that the court for that reason erred in sustaining the demurrer to
the answer. Held: Judgment affirmed. (1) Provision that note covered
deferred installments under conditional sale contract did not render it
non-negotiable. (2) Answer failing to allege that the plaintiff, the due
course holder, had knowledge that the burner for which the note was
given was of no value, or that the plaintiff had knowledge of alleged
fraudulent representations was demurrable. Berry v. Brandt C. Downey
Co. et al. Appellate Court of Indiana, July 6, 1929, 167 N. E. 136.
Section 3 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (Sec. 11362, Burns' Ann.
State.) provides that an unqualified promise to pay is unconditional within
the meaning of the act, though coupled with "a statement of the trans-
action which gives rise to the instrument." In determining whether a
reference in a note to an extraneous writing is "a statement of the trans-
action which gives rise to the instrument" or whether the reference sub-
jects the note itself to the terms of the extraneous agreement, the court
is confined to the examination of the note itself and cannot look to the
provisions of the extraneous writing for assistance; it is the negotiability
of the note and not of the extraneous writing which is being determined.
The following statements were held not to destroy the negotiability of an
otherwise negotiable instrument: "As per contract," Waterbury-Wallace
Co. v. Ivey, 99 Misc. Rep. 260, 163 N. Y. S. 719; Strand Amusement Co.
v. Fox, 205 Ala. 183, 87 Sou. 332, 14 A. L. R. 1121; "This note is given in
accordance with a land contract of even date," Doyle v. Considine, 195
Ill. App. 311; "For* payment under contract of even date," Slaughter v.
Bank of Bisbee, 17 Ariz. 484, 154 Pac. 1040; "As per terms of contract,"
National Bank of Newbury v. Wentworth, 218 Mass. 30, 105 N. E. 626.
In the latter case the court intimated that if the words had been "subject
to the contract," the note would have been made non-negotiable. In Hereth
et al. v. Meyer, 33 Ind. 511, decided before the adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, the phrase "this given for patent right," was held not
to destroy the negotiability of the note. In the recent case of Dorbecker v.
Downey Co. et al., (1928) Ind. App., 163 N. E. 535, the note contained the
identical statement involved in the instant case. In concluding that the
note in question wvas negotiable the court said: "The said note and the
said sale contract were each complete in and of themselves. There was
no interdependence, and the fact that the note, by way of recitation, men-
tioned the sales contract, did not make said sales contract a part thereof."
Granting that the note was not rendered non-negotiable by the refer-
ence to the contract, the sustaining of the demurrer to the answer is
clearly correct so far as the question of failure of consideration is con-
cerned. "Where want of consideration is pleaded by the maker of a
promissory note as a defense to the suit of an indorsee of such note, the
burden is upon the defendant to prove such defense by a fair preponder-
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ance of the evidence bearing on that question." Bright Nat'l Bank of
Flora v. Hartmcan et al., (Ind. App.) 109 N. E. 846, 849. Failure of con-
sideration is no defense as against a holder in due course, and "The burden
of proof that he is a holder in due course, is not put on the plaintiff, by
proof of total or partial failure of consideration or want of consideration.
The terms of Sec. 55, which define defective titles, do not include want
or failure of consideration." Wheat v. Goss, 193 Ind. 558, 141 N. E. 311;
Farmers Trust Co. v. Sprowl, 72 Ind. App. 564, 126 N. E. 81; Sections 55
and 59, Negotiable Instruments Act (1926 Burns' Ann. Stat., Secs. 11414
and 11418.)
The correctness of the conclusion that an answer alleging fraud, with-
out alleging knowledge by the holder of the fraud is subject to demurrer
is not so obvious. In Millikan v. Security Co., (Ind. App.) 118 N. E. 568,
the court said: ". . . Both paragraphs are bad for failure to allege
that appellee (holder) had notice of these infirmities"; in accord: Parker
v. Hickman, (Ind. App.) 111 N. E. 649. In Lapp v. Merchants Nat'l Bank
of Indianapolis, (Ind. App.) 124 N. E. 707, the court drew a distinction
between an answer failing to allege notice to the plaintiff when such an
answer was given to a complaint in which the plaintiff has not set out
that he was a holder in due course, and the case in which such an answer
as the one in the principal case is given to a complaint which does not
affirmatively allege that the plaintiff is a holder in due course. In the
former case the court points out that it is necessary to allege notice; in
the latter it is not necessary. The opinion in the principal case does not
state whether the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was a holder in due
course. The "first clause of Sec. 59 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
(Sec. 11418, Burns' Ann. Stat.) declares that "Every holder is deemed
prima facie to be a holder in due course . . ." It would seem to follow
that an allegation in the complaint of a holder that he is a due course
holder would be merely surplusage and that the distinction made in the
Lapp case is artificial and illogical. Indiana has consistently, both before
and after the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Act, held that "Where
the evidence establishes that the title of the parties negotiating the instru-
ment was defective, the holder claiming to be a purchaser in good faith
for value and without notice must make this claim good by the greater
weight of evidence." (Brannan's Negotiable Instrument Law, p. 531,
citing the Indiana case of Bright Nat'l Bank v. Hartnan, supra; First
National Bank v. Rupert, 178 Ind. 669, 100 N. E. 5; Shirk v. Neible, 156
Ind. 66, 59 N. E. 281; Ray v. Baker, 165 Ind. 74, 74 N. E. 619, I Ind. L.
Jour. 49. Since the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law the
Indiana decisions have interpreted Section 59 (11418 Burns' Ann. Stat.)
to mean that when fraud is shown that the holder has the burden of
proving that "he or some person under whom he claims acquiring a title
in due course" by a preponderance of the evidence. In Shirk v. Neible,
supra, the court says "that if the holder of paper negotiable by the law
merchant and to which the maker has exhibited a valid defense for fraud,
relies upon the fact that he is a bona fide holder thereof, for value, the
burden is upon him to aver and prove that he obtained such paper before
maturity without notice of the defense of the maker and that he paid a
valuable consideration therefor." In Ray v. Baker et al., supra, the de-
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fendant answered fraud, and the plaintiffs' reply was a general denial.
The Supreme Court said that "no question as to plaintiff's being a good-
faith purchaser can be raised under the issues. If the appellant were a
good-faith purchaser, before maturity, of commercial paper, the burden
was on him affirmatively to plead and to prove the same on the trial." It
would seem a logical inference from the above statements that an answer
alleging fraud is not vulnerable to demurrer since under the Indiana rule
the burden of proving due course holding, which includes as one element
lack of knowledge of the fraud, is on the plaintiff holder, when the
defendant has established the evidence of the fraud. It would seem to
follow that the burden of allegation is satisfied by an answer which alleges
fraud; for if the defendant in his answer must allege both the fact of
fraud and the fact of the plaintiff holder's knowledge of the fraud, he is
required to allege a fact which he is not required to prove. T. R. D.
EMINENT DOMAIN-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION-The State of Indiana under the provisions of the Indiana State
Highway Act (Burns' 1926, Sec. 8268 et seq.) and the general Eminent
Domain Act (Burns' 1926, Sec. 7680 et seq.) brought this action to con-
demn three and nine-tenths acres of the appellee's land in Parke County.
Appraisers were appointed and assessed the damages to the land at $7,000.
The State in this action requested instructions to the effect that in arriv-
ing at the compensation to be awarded to the appellee that the benefits as
well as the damages to the land should be taken into consideration. The
court refused this instruction. The State relied on See. 7685 of Burns'
1926, reading in part "in case land is sought to be taken by a municipal
corporation for public use that confers any benefits on the land, the report
shall also state the benefits." The State's contention is in effect that it
is a municipal corporation within the contemplation of the above section
and that therefore the benefits to the land should have been reported
along with the damages. Held: The State is not a municipal corporation
within the meaning of Sec. 7685, Burns' 1926. State v. Brubeck, Supreme
Court of Indiana, Feb. 19, 1930, 170 N. E. 81.
The State has the power of eminent domain. State of Georg.*a v. City
of Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 44 Sup. Ct. 369. A state has the right to
say upon what property or to what extent the right of eminent domain
shall be exercised. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville and Nash-
ville R. R. Co., 258 U. S. 13. A municipal corporation has no inherent
power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when authorized and
in the manner authorized by the State Legislature. City of Los Angeles
v. Koyer, 48 Cal. App. 720, 192 Pac. 301.
In Indiana a municipal corporation has been given the right of eminent
domain and as an incident to that right has been given the privilege of
assessing the benefits as well as the damages to the land in arriving at
the compensation to be awarded. Acts of 1905, ch. 48-7680 Burns 1926.
The State has the power of eminent domain inherently, but unless it can
qualify under the above statute as a municipal corporation it must com-
pensate for the damage done but cannot take advantage of the benefits
conferred on the land, to reduce the compensation to be paid for the land.
A municipal corporation is a body corporate and politic created by law
